Organization accounts and short-lived sessions
Security architecture
Security is not wrapped around Anthouse. It is how Anthouse is built.
Anthouse is the evidence and deployment layer for an organization’s software estate. The control plane is built on AWS in Frankfurt with private data services, separated credentials, KMS-backed encryption, tenant-scoped authorization and releases bound to verified source.
The protection chain
Five boundaries. No single point of trust.
Role checks at every protected operation
Envelope encryption with AWS KMS
Private PostgreSQL in isolated subnets
Immutable images and commit-bound deployment
Security controls
Strong defaults that are difficult to bypass.
Anthouse protects the complete evidence lifecycle—from the first connector token through the organization record, model-assisted review, governed deployment and export.
Tenant isolation
Every organization-scoped operation resolves membership and role before accessing data. Tenant selection never grants membership, and authorization entry points are inventoried and checked in CI.
Encrypted connector credentials
Google Workspace refresh tokens and provider credentials use AES-256-GCM envelope encryption. Per-record data keys are wrapped by a dedicated AWS KMS key in Frankfurt.
Private data plane
PostgreSQL runs on Amazon RDS in isolated database subnets with no public route. Application access uses separated service credentials, required TLS and pinned RDS trust roots.
Restricted workloads
Services run as non-root, unprivileged AWS Fargate containers with Linux capabilities dropped, no public IP, ECS Exec disabled, and tightly scoped task roles.
Separated identities
Authentication, runtime, capture, delivery and migration workloads use distinct database identities and secret keys. Ordinary services are explicitly denied the RDS administrator credential.
Verified releases
Services deploy from immutable ECR image digests. The release pipeline binds the exact successful commit to its images, applies reviewed infrastructure and verifies the public endpoint.
Purpose-bound encryption
Database storage, credentials, provider tokens, service logs, queues, artifacts and release journals use purpose-specific encryption keys and scoped IAM policies.
Privacy-minimized evidence
Application review uses bounded activity metadata, capabilities and aggregate counts. Message bodies, prompts and document contents are not required to establish application activity.
Technology stack
One regional control plane, purpose-separated services.
Anthouse owns its authentication boundary and runs its control plane, data services, release infrastructure and operational safeguards on AWS.
Isolated service containers in private application subnets.
Private Frankfurt database, TLS verification and separated SQL identities.
Purpose-specific keys, envelope encryption and scoped workload access.
Encrypted artifacts, immutable images, queues, alerts and authentication email.
Protected HTTPS ingress, private workloads and an isolated database tier.
Encrypted telemetry and commit-bound, role-scoped releases.
Subprocessors
A short, understandable data path.
Core infrastructure, billing and optional model analysis are separated so organizations can understand exactly which services apply.
Anthouse gives 30 days’ notice before adding a subprocessor that handles customer data. Contact security@anthouse.io for security and data-processing questions.
Optional device evidence
Find the applications that never appear in an identity audit.
Google Workspace reveals authorized SaaS activity. The optional Anthouse collector adds the local side of the picture: applications, runtimes and network services operating on organization-managed computers, including internally deployed tools and local AI services.
- Enrolls into one organization with a scoped credential
- Reports application and local-service evidence over TLS
- Preserves device and observation provenance
- Complements Workspace evidence without becoming mandatory
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PlatformmacOSHealthy
Local serviceOllama · :11434Observed
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RuntimeNode.js service · :3000Observed
Evidence remains isolated to the enrolling organization.
Connected discovery fabric
Identity, security, cloud and devices tell one evidence story.
Each connector preserves its source and provenance while Anthouse correlates matching evidence into one application context. Organization administrators control every connection, synchronization and revocation.
OAuth audit, token grants and managed Chrome usage reveal third-party SaaS activity, active users and granted capabilities.
Enterprise applications, service principals, sign-in activity and consent grants expose the Microsoft identity side of the software estate.
Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne and Sophos contribute installed-software, device and security evidence already collected across managed endpoints.
GitHub, Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare and connected delivery systems reveal repositories, deployments, providers and technical ownership.
The optional Anthouse collector reports local applications, runtimes and network services that identity and cloud sources cannot see.
Responsible disclosure
Found something? Tell the people who can fix it.
Email security@anthouse.io. We acknowledge good-faith reports within one business day and keep the reporter updated through resolution.
We do not pursue legal action against good-faith research that avoids other organizations’ data and does not degrade the service.